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May 11, 1971

STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D . , MONTANA)

Mr . President:
I ask unanimous consent to introduce an amendment to
H. R . 6531, a bill to amend the Military Selective Service Act
of 1967 ; to authorize military active duty strengths for fiscal
year 1972; and for other purposes .

I further request that, after

the reading of the amendment, the Senate proceed to its immediate
consideration.
The essential purpose of this amendment is to bring about
a reduction of approximately 150,000 armed forces personnel below
the number presently stationed in Europe .
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In short, the amendment says it is too late for
the United States Government to keep playing the role of
Wilkins Micawber, hoping that something will soon "turn up."
Something has indeed turned up:

a full-blown monetary crisis

created in large part b y our failure to deal decisively with
our enormous balance of payments deficits.

These in turn

derive mainly from our military expenditures in Vietnam, in
Europe, and elsewhere around the world.

Mr. President, for several years now other Senators
and I who have long felt that an · excessive number of American
troops and dependents are stationed in Europe have been
strenuously cautioned against precipitous
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action to reduce those totals.

Several times I have

introduced resolutions making clear our belief in the
need for a substantial reduction in our forces in Europe.
Several times I have held off action because I have not
wished to disrupt an allegedly delicate situation, or to
give any justification to those who might charge that we
in the Senate have not given the most mature and informed
consideration to the problem.
The cautionary voices urging us to wait and see have
raised a variety of reasons for inaction.

Again and again

we are told there can be no question but that the present
level of American troops in Europe in time must be reduced,
and reduced substantially.

But the cautionary voices keep

murmuring that now is not the time.
We have been told that so-called offset agreements
with West Germany are going far toward closing the serious
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U.S. balance of payments deficits incurred by our
military expenditures in Europe.

Yet on examination we

have found that much of the offset payment has turned
out to be relatively short-term German loans to the United
States.

These merely postpone our problem; they do nothing

to resolve it.
Then at the NATO ministerial meeting late last year
quite a different tack was attempted.

In December we were

told that our European allies would be making a special
effort to strengthen their forces.

As part of the supposed

bargain the United States would not only maintain its
current levels of forces intact, but would also contribute
to the projected increased effectiveness of the Alliance's
military position.

Once again, close examination reveals

that the much-touted special effort over the period of the
next five years at best will represent rather modest progress.
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Over each of the next five years the Europeans together
plan to spend an additional $100 million toward improving
their force levels and readiness, while a similar sum
would be invested in infrastructure-- that is, the facilities
located on European soil for logistical and related purposes .
In any one of the next five years the combined extra
European effort would amount to roughly $200 million, or
about one- ninth of the annual U. S. balance of payments
deficit incurred as a result of American military expenditures in Europe.

This, to me, is not a very impressive

effort when one considers how much energy and time went
into arguing for an increase which would encourage Americans
to believe that the corner had at last been turned.
When other arguments fail- - as indeed they have- -the
executive branch always seems to fall back on something
which we can only call the psychological argument.

We have
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been lectured constantly over the last year on the theme
that West German efforts to promote detente, under the
heading of Ostpolitik, should not be disrupted or endangered
in the slightest by any action which would affect the
balance of military forces in Europe.

No one is more

interested than I in promoting a peaceful dialogue between
the Soviet Union and the Western allies leading to a
permanent and reliable stabilization of the European scene.
However, I have never believed that this is a short-term
proposition or process.

If we are to wait for the full

success of Ostpolitik before we can change our force levels
in Europe, then we may have to be prepared to endure a
stalemate which could last for one or two decades, or longer.
The related point is also stressed that we must take
no action which could jeopardize the political position of
the Brandt Government in Germany.

There is no question about
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the depth of the Chancellor's commitment to the West.
Yet it is conjectured that some other German leader in
the future might try to work out a unilateral deal with
the Soviet Union at the expense of the Alliance if the
United States were to jar the supposedly delicate
psychological balance of the German people.
this sort of argument is not flattering to

Frankly,
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~rnae e~~ ~-£--anymore than comparable specula-

tion abroad is to us about the possible faithlessness of
the United States.

Both countries should resent and

reject these hypotheses.

Indeed, one could turn the

argument around and say that, since the leaders of the
two largest German political parties are unquestioned
advocates of Western European unity, it would be better
to scale down the

u.s.

presence while they are in office

and can handle any possible repercussions.
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Mr. President, today we are seeing the high cost of
postponement of consideration of urgent problems.

Time

and again members of this body have taken the floor to
discuss our persistent and increasing balance of payments
deficits, to urge immediate attention to the problem and
to prophesy critical times ahead if matters are left for
the most convenient time.

The distinguished senior

Senator from Missouri in particular has given us an
excellent lead in warning against just what has come to
pass:

yet another international monetary upheaval.
Last year the United States incurred a record balance

of payments deficit of over $10 billion on an official
settlements basis.

Instead of taking the lead in calling

for early and dramatic measures to overhaul the system
which could produce such disruptive deficits, the Executive
Branch devoted most of its efforts to figuring out different
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means of computing the balance of payments formula and
to assuring us that the situation--although admittedly
less than desirable--was tolerable.
Unfortunately, the financial community in Western
Europe has taken quite a different view of the international
monetary scene.

While we have been

wo~rying

about the

fancied psychological problems of West Germany, Europeans
have been worrying about the very real problems of the
United States.

When they looked at this country they have

seen mounting waves of unrest breaking on a beach where
the Administration figuratively sits like King Canute with
arms folded saying that it would not be moved by the urgency
of the situation.

Confidence in the willingness of the

United States to put its house in order has certainly not
been increased by our display of stubborn petulance.

It

is too bad we have forgotten the original point of the story
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was that of an astute ruler showing his adoring courtiers
that his power had limits.
In fact, the European reaction amounts to a vote of
no confidence in the international monetary policies
pursued by our Government.

Ironically, taking a lead in

giving expression to this sentiment has been the country
which has most strongly encouraged us to keep on playing
the same world role and to keep our forces in Europe intact.
When the chips are down it appears that a number of our
European allies are far more interested in their domestic
concerns than they are in the international scene which
they expect us to improve.
It seems to me we have been refusing to face up to a
paradoxical European attitude which has persisted for some
half-dozen years.

On the one hand, many of our European

friends constantly urge us to maintain unchanged our
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commitments and our military forces.

On the other

hand, they argue strenuously for a reduction in our
payments deficits which are incurred largely from the
activities which they say cannot be altered.

As far as

Vietnam is concerned, the NATO allies offer little
advice and less help; at

tk'- French4#•s. . . .t~

least~

do us

the favor of speaking their minds clearly and forcefully
in urging withdrawal.
While a number of palliatives have been proposed and
applied, our payments position in Europe and the world has
deteriorated further.

For example, in fiscal year 1968

the amount of U.S. defense expenditures entering the
international balance of payments in Western Europe was
about $1.611 billion.
to $1.586 billion.

In 1969 the figure fell slightly

In fiscal year 1970, however, the figure

had risen again to more than $1.731 billion.
hardly be termed progress.

This could
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Now we are in a position where we must break out
of this endless circle of frustration and take clear-cut
action to reduce the payments deficits which have weakened
international confidence in the dollar.

Our European

friends have met urgently to discuss means of coping with
the currency crisis.

Their main accomplishment was to

reject for their own individual domestic reasons the
compromise proposal put forward by the Commission of the
European Community.

In one case, we find the Finance

Minister of a friendly nation avidly seeking the devaluation
of the United States dollar.

But there is no purpose to

be served in complaining about the alarms and excursions
of the international monetary situation.

Our Government

is just as much to blame as any other for failing to read
the message on the wall.

- 13 -

Mr . President, my amendment is designed to bring
about early relief to our pressing payments deficits abroad •

•
It is an amendment wnich is necessaryJl It will permit 150,000
American military personnel still to be stationed in Europe .
Further, if these troops that will be returned are disbanded
upon their return to the United States, it will represent a
further gain for our budget, as well as our balance of payments.
The financial savings in that case could well be as high as one
and a half billion dollars .
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It may be argued by some that this leaves uncertain
the intentions of the United States with respect to the
defense of Western Europe and with respect to the numbers
of American forces for that defense.

But if there is one

cardinal foreign policy tenet agreed upon by virtually
all Americans, it is the proposition that Western Europe
for a variety of reasons must not be allowed to come
under Soviet or other external domination.

I will not go

into all the many arguments we have made publicly over the
last few years to support our contention that there is no
compelling military argument for the exact number of forces
which we now maintain in Europe.

Instead I would like to

append to this statement an article on this subject by a
recently retired army officer, Edward L. King, written for
the October 1970 issue of the Forum periodical, published
by the Ripon Society.

I be

eve Colonel Klng makes many
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I ask unanimous consent that
the article be printed in the Record .

Mr . President, in closing these remarks let me
stress that I believe my amendment represents a construetive move which will respond not only to the demands of
American citizens for greater expenditures at home rather
than abroad, but also to the demands of our European allies
for urgent American measures to get our payments deficits
under control .

This does not in any way represent a

withdrawal from Western Europe or its defense .

It is

quite simply an illustration of the old French saying that
one recoils in order to jump better .
Our forces in Europe have been inflated and musclebound,
with far more logistical than combat capability.

It is my

conviction, and that of many other observers-- including
experienced military men- - that trimming away the fat in
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the form of excess supplies and headquarters will result in
a leaner, more mobile, and more effident combat force.

s. · · · · · ·- - - - - -

9~CONGRESS

lst_ SESSION

H. R. - - - - - - - - - - - - - IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

l

Referred to the Committee on - - - - - - - - - - - - - a n d ordered to be printed.
Order~
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to lie on the table and to be printed.
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Intended to be proposed by Mr. ········----~~!i~~~~-~!?-----··-······--------------

to S. ······-············-···--, a bill
HR
6531
an Act to amend the Military Selective
Service Act or·r9·6r;-·to··rncrease inil1 tary pay; to authori.ze mili tacy
active duty strengths for fiscal year 1972; and for other purposes,
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viz:

At the end of the bill add a new title as follows:
TITLE IV--REDUCTION OF UNITED STATES MILITARY
FORCES IN EUROPE
Sec. 401.

(a) The Congress hereby finds that the number

of United States military personnel stationed in Europe can be
I

.

/significantly reduced without endangering the security of Western
I Europe, and that such a reduction would have a favorable effect

on this Nation's balance of payments problem and would help avoid
recurring international monetary crises involving the value of. the
dollar abroad.

It is therefore the purpose of this section to

provide for such a reduction at the earliest practicable date.
(b) No funds appropriated by the Congress ·may be used after
December 31, 1971, for the purpose of supporting or maintaining in
Europe any military personnel of the United States in excess of

/So, ooo ·

Amdt. No.
' •
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